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Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines four claims of Brexit supporters on the United Kingdom’s post-exit 
arrangement regarding trade with the EU. It reviews the nature and importance of  UK-EU 
trade links and the possible impact on the UK of leaving the EU customs union. It argues that 
the claims of pro-Brexit supporters on trade possibilities are based on incongruous arguments 
which are either logically inconsistent or ignore the extent of commitment required by trade 
agreements that tackle regulatory barriers, not just tariffs and border restrictions. We 
demonstrate that the “attractiveness” of the UK market will decline as the UK enters in 
progressively more agreements. We conclude by analysing the implications for the UK of 
“taking back control” of its trade policy.  
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Introduction 
 
Ever since the June referendum in the UK on withdrawal from the European Union, there has 
been almost daily speculation, commentary and analysis on the post-exit arrangements that 
may apply to trade between the UK and the EU1. Brussels think tanks such as CEPS and Bruegel 
have also published several papers on Brexit. 
 
The proponents of Brexit have made a number of claims purporting to show that in the field 
of trade, the UK will benefit from being able to set its own agenda and choose its own trade 
partners. The UK may indeed gain by not being a member of the EU. However, the mooted 
post-exit arrangements are fraught with serious drawbacks. The purpose of this paper is to 
analyse four of the Bexiters’ main claims and show that they are either logically inconsistent 
or one-sided as they ignore significant negative effects. 
 
Those claims are the following: 
1. The EU accounts for less than 50% of the UK trade. 
2. The UK has not much to lose by leaving the EU’s customs union. 
3. The UK has much to gain by concluding bilateral trade agreements by itself. 
4. The UK will be able to pursue an open trade policy without being held back by the 
protectionist tendencies of other Member States. 
 
The paper concludes with analysis of the consequences of the UK’s attempt to “take back 
control” of its policies, including trade policy. Taking back control has been the emotionally 
powerful and, admittedly, successful slogan of the proponents of Brexit. We will argue, 
however, that since most trade agreements are not anymore about border restrictions but 
about domestic regulation and market access, taking back control will leave the UK exposed 
to the vagaries of Brussels-based regulation that has international reach. 
 
 
Claim 1: The EU accounts for less than 50% of the UK trade 
 
This is largely true. Eurostat data show that in 2015 only 44% of the UK exports went to other 
EU countries. Only Malta exported less than 50% of its exports to the rest of the EU [45%]. 
The EU average is 63%. On the import side, the EU was the origin of only 54% of the UK’s total 
imports. Only Greece and the Netherlands had lower shares than the UK, with 53% and 46%, 
respectively. The top ten trade partners of the UK however were all EU Member States except 
for the US (14.5%), China (7%) and Switzerland (6%). Hence, the EU is the largest trade partner 
of the UK. 
 
However, the headline trade data do not give the true picture of the extent of the UK’s 
commercial links with non-EU countries. Through the EU, the UK also has access to third 
                                                          
1 See, for example, the e-book on Brexit, which is a compilation of columns that have been published 
on “voxeu.org”, the special page of the “Financial Times”, which collects the various articles dealing 
with the prospective negotiations and consequences of Brexit, the page of the UK National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research addressing Brexit-related issues, the Centre for European Reform 
page on Britain & the EU or Open Europe’s Britain & the EU. 
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countries with which the EU has signed trade agreements such as Mexico, Chile, Algeria, 
South-Africa, Singapore, South Korea, Turkey, and pretty soon with Vietnam and Canada. 
Since these countries account for a sizeable part (about 15-20%) of the UK’s transactions with 
the rest of the world, it follows that in reality the UK already trades with those countries via 
the EU agreements. It means that preferential trade agreements cover about 60-65% of the 
UK’s total trade. In other words, the UK is preparing to abandon arrangements that cover 60-
65% of its trade in order to sign its own agreements with countries that account for the 
remaining 35-40% of its trade. It should be noted that these numbers do not include the EU 
current negotiations with countries such as Japan. Admittedly, Brexiters have also argued, 
without explaining how, that they will improve on existing bilateral agreements. It remains to 
be seen how that can be achieved. 
 
The accuracy of the trade data has also been disputed because a large proportion of European 
trade with third countries passes through the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp. The significant 
amount of pass-through trade may exaggerate the importance of the EU as either origin or 
destination of the UK’s trade. It is always difficult to pin point the origin or destination of 
goods that go through large ports. Transhipments are routine, especially given the fact that 
traded products are carried by increasingly larger container ships which serve only the biggest 
ports. On this issue, the UK Office for National Statistics concluded that the size of pass-
through may be about 4% of the UK’s imports from and exports to the EU2 ].  
 
Hence, even when the distorting effect of pass-through trade is taken into account, the EU 
still remains by far the UK’s largest trade partner. 
 
 
Claim 2: The UK has not much to lose by leaving the EU’s customs union 
 
The EU’s customs union is indispensable for internal free trade. If Member States were free 
to sign their own agreements with third countries and set their own tariff rates, then it would 
be necessary to monitor internal frontiers to prevent third-country products from entering 
through the low-tariff Member States. A free trade agreement between the UK and the EU 
will unbind the UK from the EU’s common external tariff and enable it to negotiate and 
conclude bilateral trade deals. But Brexiters omit three consequences of this freedom. 
 
First, there will have to be controls and formalities in bilateral trade. “Rules of origin” will 
have to be applied in order to determine which products should benefit from duty-free 
treatment. Rules of origin normally define the minimum value that has to be added to a 
product in order for that product to be considered as domestic and benefit from free 
circulation in a free trade area. But these rules are costly to comply with and costly to enforce. 
In April 2016, the “HM Treasury analysis on the long-term economic impact of EU membership 
and the alternatives” summarised the findings of several studies that estimated that rules of 
origin could add 3%-15% extra cost to normal trade costs3.  
                                                          
2 UK Office for National Statistics, UK Trade in Goods estimates and the ‘Rotterdam Effect’, 6 
February 2015 
3 HM Government (April 2016), HM Treasury analysis: the long-term economic impact of EU 
membership and the alternatives, p. 163 
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Second, these rules of origin will also distort trade and investment decisions. This is 
particularly true in industries with long value-chains whereby companies import a large 
proportion of their components. The following example illustrates the distortionary effect of 
rules of origin. 
 
Assume a company based in a partner country makes a product using three inputs, each of 
which costs as follows: A = 30; B = 30; C (labour) = 45. Inputs A & B are imported from third 
countries into the partner country; A is from a country subject to zero tariff and B is from a 
country that is subject to a 20% tariff. Therefore, the total cost to the company, after the 
tariff, is 111 [= 30 + 36 + 45]. Further assume that this company is a price taker because it 
operates in a competitive market. If it sells its product at 111 it just breaks even. It also means 
that its added value is 40% [= 45/111], which is the proportion of labour in the value (price) 
of the product.  
 
Let the rule of origin be as follows in this particular case: A product is “domestic” [i.e. it can 
be imported from the partner country duty free] if the value-added is at minimum 40%. If 
value-added is below 40%, products which are imported from the partner country incur a 
tariff of also 20%. In our particular case the product in question can indeed be considered as 
domestic. 
 
Now assume that that company can import an improved component B at a higher cost of 40 
instead of 30 and save 50% of the labour costs of assembling the final product. The imported 
component costs 40 + a tariff of 20%, which means that the total cost per unit is 100.5 [= 30 
+ 40 + 8 + 22.5]. If the final consumer price remains 111, the company gains by making a profit 
of 10.5 per unit it sells. However, there is a problem. The value added [labour of 22.5 plus 
profit of 10.5] is now just 30% [= 33/111]. Since the value-added is less than 40%, the product 
is no longer “domestic” and when it is imported from the partner country it attracts a tariff. 
Let the tariff rate on the complete product be also 20%. The minimum price that the company 
can charge to domestic consumers, after the tariff, is 121 [= 100.5 + 20%]. As a consequence, 
the company cannot sell anything. 
 
However, in a customs union that includes the two countries, the total cost of that product is 
only 100.5 [= 30 + 48 + 22.5]. The company would have been able to make a profit of 10.5. 
But in our case the rules of origin that regulate trade within free trade areas force the 
company to move production inside the free trade area or find alternative inputs or locate in 
a country whose exports to the free trade area are not subject to tariffs. Rules of origin affect 
location decisions not according to real costs but according to how tariffs are levied. 
 
Third, the Rotterdam-Antwerp effect mentioned earlier will come into play in a negative way. 
If, as Brexiters argue, the UK is less dependent on the EU because a significant proportion of 
its trade with the EU is accounted by transhipments that pass through major ports, it also 
means that in the future an equal amount of trade will be subject to customs formalities. The 
lower the dependence on the EU, the larger the transhipments but also the larger the amount 
of trade that will be subject to those formalities. 
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In addition, if, at present, UK traded goods pass through the major European ports because it 
is more efficient that they are transported first on very large vessels and then transhipped 
after they arrive in continental Europe, or that they are first sent to the big European ports 
before they are exported outside the EU, it follows that diverting that trade from those big 
ports and directly receiving goods from or sending goods to third countries will become more 
costly, regardless of customs formalities. Brexiters thus clearly underestimate the costs that 
businesses will have to incur if the UK leaves the EU customs union.  
 
 
Claim 3: The UK has much to gain by concluding bilateral trade agreements 
 
The statement that the EU’s customs union prevents Member States from concluding 
individual trade agreements is true. The EU has exclusive competence in what Article 207 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union defines as “the common commercial 
policy”. But the implications which are typically drawn are far from being correct. Regardless 
of the UK’s intentions, the ability of the UK to enter into many bilateral agreements with third 
countries will also depend on the willingness of other countries to remove their trade 
restrictions. Much has been written about whether the UK will be able to wield negotiating 
power and whether other countries will be interested to spend time negotiating with a 
country whose economy is only a seventh of the EU’s size or whose consumers account for 
only an eighth of the EU’s total. Although the UK does not have either the EU’s attractiveness 
in terms of size or the EU’s negotiating power, it cannot be excluded that some countries will 
still find it worthwhile to conclude trade agreements with the UK. 
 
The nature of new trade agreements 
 
However, the UK’s eagerness to enter into bilateral arrangements with third countries may 
not be sufficient to actually secure such agreements. Trade agreements at present are hardly 
about tariffs and border restrictions. In most industrial countries, tariffs have long been 
lowered to the insignificant levels of a few percentage points. Now, trade agreements are 
“deep” in the sense that they are mainly about such things as domestic product standards, 
health and safety rules, regulation of establishment and investment and public procurement. 
A case in point is the recently concluded Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between Canada and the EU. It is 1600 pages not because it defines long lists of 
customs duties but because it covers mostly domestic regulations and procedures. It is a so-
called “mixed” agreement because it deals with issues which do not fall within the exclusive 
trade competence of the EU. This is also the reason why its signing was held up by the Walloon 
parliament. 
 
CETA as well as the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have been 
the focal point of media coverage. But these two agreements are far from being isolated 
examples. They belong to a trend which is revealed by the agreements mentioned in table 1 
below. Custom duties are the least significant issue. For example, of the more than 1000 
pages of the recently agreed EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, only 10 are devoted to the 
elimination of custom duties. The very limited importance and therefore the very limited 
space devoted to customs duties is reflected in all the main trade agreements that the EU has 
been negotiating in the past five years – finalised or ongoing. There is no exception. They all 
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include chapters on investment, services, establishment, industry-specific regulation, 
intellectual property and competition policy among others. These issues are covered by 
agreements with both developed and developing countries, regardless of the geographic or 
cultural proximity of the countries. The so-called “free-trade agreements” now contain 
extensive chapters in addition to the provisions on duties. A case in point is the increasing 
importance of trade in services. In terms of value added, the UK trades more in services than 
in goods. The UK Trade Policy Observatory of the University of Sussex recently stressed how 
Brexit could deteriorate the UK’s trade in services both with EU and non-EU partners.4 
                                                          
4 See “Services trade in the UK: what is at stake?” of Ingo Borchert and “The UK Trade Landscape 
After Brexit” of Emily Lydgate, Jim Rollo and Rorden Wilkinson.  
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Table 1: Areas covered by trade agreements that the EU has recently concluded or that it is currently negotiating 
 Transatlantic 
Trade and 
Investment 
Partnership 
(TTIP) 
EU-Canada 
Comprehensi
ve Economic 
and Trade 
Agreement 
(CETA) 
EU-
Singapore 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
EU-South 
Korea Free 
Trade 
Agreement 
EU-Japan Free 
Trade Agreement 
and Economic 
Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) 
EU-Ukraine 
Deep and 
Comprehens
ive Free 
Trade Area 
(DCFTA)5 
EU-
Vietnam 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
Market access for goods  
Custom duties (tariffs) X X X X X X X 
Trade in services and establishment  
Investment X X X X X X X 
Government procurement X X X X X X X 
E-commerce X X X X X X X 
Dispute settlement X X X X X X X 
Industry-specific regulation  
Technical barriers to trade 
(horizontal measures) 
X X X X X X X 
Specific sectoral agreements6 X X X X X X X 
Other rules & modes of cooperation  
Intellectual property7 X X X X X X X 
Competition policy X X X X X X X 
Trade remedies8 X X X X X X X 
Sustainable development 
provisions 
X X X X X X X 
 
Source: authors, based on information from the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission9  
                                                          
5 As part of the Association Agreement 
6 e.g. pharmaceuticals or agri-food, i.e. sanitary and phytosanitary measure 
7 Including Geographical Indications 
8 e.g. anti-dumping practices 
9 Accessible here 
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Global regulatory competition and convergence 
 
When trade agreements were mostly about reduction of tariffs, it made sense, within the 
logic of reciprocal liberalisation, to negotiate bilateral tariff reduction schedules. A country 
would reduce its customs duties in response to the reduction of the duties of another country. 
 
When it comes to domestic regulation, the object of bilateral agreements is either mutual 
recognition or harmonisation of the rules enforced within the jurisdictions (i.e. territories) of 
the parties to the agreement. Mutual recognition can indeed be subject to a reciprocal 
arrangement and different reciprocal agreements can be agreed sequentially and all of them 
can co-exist. But harmonisation can proceed in a sequential manner only if trade partners one 
by one converge to the standard of one country, which in this case would be the UK. It is 
simply not possible to harmonise regulations with different partners in a way that all such 
agreements can co-exist. The only possibility for co-existence when a country, in this case the 
UK, is a partner in all agreement is if they are all harmonised to a single standard. 
 
But how likely will it be that all potential partners will want to adopt UK rules? The answer is 
that it is very unlikely. In fact, recent research has shown that most countries in the global 
trade system are converging to EU standards and regulations. This has been aptly branded 
the “Brussels effect” [see Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, Northwestern University Law 
Review, 2012, vol. 107(1), pp. 1-67]. The reason is that the EU pursues an active regulatory 
policy and it has the largest single market in the world in terms of monetary size. No company 
can afford to be locked out of the EU market and therefore every company manufactures its 
products and tailors its services so that they comply with EU rules. Hence the belief that the 
UK will be able to sign many “deep” trade agreements is rather illusory. It can be noted 
nonetheless that because the UK is part of the EU until it formally leaves it, it will still share 
the same rules for a number of years, which in turn means that third countries, because of 
the Brussels effect, will not have to adapt to specific UK rules in the short term.  
 
In the long run, the only solution for the UK in order to sign deep trade agreements with third 
countries is to cling on to EU rules. But it will then have lost, because of Brexit, all negotiating 
power to define new EU rules. And this outcome will frustrate Brexiters’ wish to regain the 
ability to frame their own rules. 
 
Negotiating power 
 
The “Brussels effect” is not the only hurdle for the UK. With the recent trend towards 
comprehensive agreements, negotiations require more time to come to fruition. As shown in 
table 2 below, the EU and Canada have finalised CETA after more than seven years. The 
negotiations for the EU-Japan Free Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement have already 
been through a staggering seventeen rounds of negotiations without the certainty of reaching 
a compromise any time soon. This does not auger well for the UK. First of all, the negotiations 
can easily extend beyond the mandate of the present government. A new government may 
have other priorities. This uncertainty may deter potential trade partners from entering into 
negotiations. Ironically, the EU in this matter benefits from its greater political inertia. The 
three main political groups in the European Parliament – the EPP, the S&D and ALDE – form 
a relatively stable majority. 
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Table 2: EU trade agreements that have recently been signed or are currently being negotiated 
 
 Transatlantic 
Trade and 
Investment 
Partnership 
(TTIP) 
EU-Canada 
Comprehensive 
Economic and 
Trade 
Agreement 
(CETA) 
EU-Singapore 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
(EUSFTA) 
EU-South Korea 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
EU-Japan Free 
Trade 
Agreement and 
Economic 
Partnership 
Agreement 
(EPA) 
EU-Ukraine Deep 
and 
Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA), as part of 
the Association 
Agreement 
EU-Vietnam 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
Current status Being 
negotiated 
Being ratified Being ratified Applies 
provisionally 
since 2011 
Being 
negotiated 
Applies 
provisionally since 
January 2016 
Being 
ratified 
Length of 
agreement10 
At least 250 
pages, plus 
appendixes 
and annexes 
1600 pages Above 1000 
pages 
1432 pages Information not 
available 
600 pages (Title IV 
of the Association 
Agreement + 
protocols) 
Above 500 
pages 
Length of 
negotiations and 
number of rounds 
 
15 rounds 
since July 2013 
13 rounds from 
April 2009 
From March 
2010 to October 
2014 
7 rounds from 
May 2007 to 
October 2009 
17 rounds from 
November 2012 
From July 2008 to 
December 2011 
with remaining 
provisions signed 
in June 2014 
14 rounds 
from June 
2012 to 
January 
2016 
 
Source: authors, based on information from the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission11 
 
                                                          
10 Some numbers are estimates 
11 Accessible here 
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The second effect of the trend towards deep agreements is that the costs of negotiations in 
terms of personnel have escalated. The UK will have to bear these costs alone and its 
negotiators will be on a very steep learning curve. 
   
Size of the market 
 
Another factor that will temper the UK’s ability to conclude many bilateral arrangements is 
the fact that every trade deal makes the UK less attractive for potential new partner countries. 
Indeed, as the UK concludes an agreement and the products of the partner country in 
question gain access to the UK’s market, there will be less opportunities for potential new 
entrants. To see why this is necessarily so, consider the following simple model in which 
“attractiveness” is defined by how much a foreign country can sell in the UK’s market. 
 
Assume the existence of a three-country global trade system, the UK and two other identical 
countries. Let domestic demand and supply for a certain product in the UK be defined by the 
equations showed below: P = 𝑎𝑎 –  bQ  ;  P = cQ. 
 
Q indicates quantity, P is price and 𝑎𝑎, b and c are parameters. For simplicity, let the supply 
lines, or export lines, of the other two countries be the same as Q = P
c
. [We do not examine 
the domestic demand in those two countries simply because we assume that the product in 
question is for export to the UK].  
 
In a state of autarky, the market in the UK clears at price 𝑃𝑃∗ and quantity 𝑄𝑄∗ : 
𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑏𝑏+𝑎𝑎
  ; 𝑄𝑄∗ = 𝑎𝑎
𝑏𝑏+𝑎𝑎
. 
 
Now assume free trade starts between the UK and the other two countries and that the 
exports of each of them to the UK are also given by equation P = cQ. Although demand 
continues to be represented by P = 𝑎𝑎 –  bQ, total supply is now P = cQ
3
 [this is because to 
derive the total supply, the three individual supply lines have to be added horizontally and 
therefore the slope of the total supply line, given by parameter c, is three times flatter, c/3].  
 
Under these conditions, the market clears at the price and quantity supplied: 
𝑃𝑃1 = 𝑎𝑎c3b+c   ; 𝑄𝑄1 = 3𝑎𝑎3b+c 
 
Indeed, as expected, P1 < P* and Q1 > Q*. Trade leads to lower prices and larger quantities. 
 
Let the UK impose an MFN tariff, t, on both trade partners. The supply of each partner is given 
by the supply equation that incorporates the tariff, P =  c(1+t)Q
2
 . Total supply is P = c(1+t)Q
3+𝑡𝑡
 .  
The market now clears at price and quantity as indicated below: 
𝑃𝑃2 = 𝑎𝑎 �1 – � 𝑏𝑏
𝑏𝑏+
𝑐𝑐(1+𝑡𝑡)
𝑎𝑎+𝑡𝑡
� � ; 𝑄𝑄2 = 𝑎𝑎
𝑏𝑏+
𝑐𝑐(1+𝑡𝑡)
𝑎𝑎+𝑡𝑡
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If the UK forms a free trade area with one of the two countries but continues to levy an MFN 
tariff on imports from the other country, total supply is P = c(1+t)Q
3+2𝑡𝑡
 . 
The market clearing price and the quantity are: 
𝑃𝑃3 = 𝑎𝑎 �1 – � 𝑏𝑏
𝑏𝑏+
𝑐𝑐(1+𝑡𝑡)
𝑎𝑎+2𝑡𝑡
 �� ; 𝑄𝑄3 = 𝑎𝑎
𝑏𝑏+
𝑐𝑐(1+𝑡𝑡)
𝑎𝑎+2𝑡𝑡
  
 
We can now compare the outcomes of a free trade agreement, first, with one country and 
then with the other. For simplification we assume that there are no rules of origin and that 
when the UK forms free trade areas with both countries, that is equivalent to free trade. 
 
The impact of the first trade agreement on total supply within the UK is given by Difference 1 
(D1) showed below: 
𝐷𝐷1 = FTA1 –  MFN trade = Q3 –  Q2 = 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎3𝑏𝑏 + 2𝑏𝑏 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 
 
The impact of the second free trade agreement is given by Difference 2: D2 = Free Trade –  FTA1 = Q1 –  Q3 = 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐(3𝑏𝑏 + 2𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐)(3𝑏𝑏 + 𝑐𝑐) 
 
It follows that D1 > D2 because 1 >  c
3𝑏𝑏+𝑎𝑎
 .  
 
This means that the first country gains more (sells more) than the second country. This proves 
that free trade agreements become progressively less attractive to potential new trade 
partners. 
 
 
Claim 4: The UK will be able to pursue an open trade policy without being held back 
by the protectionist tendencies of other Member States 
 
The UK is has built a reputation for its liberal stance and pro-market contributions to 
deliberations in Brussels on issues ranging from product safety to banking regulation to 
industrial subsidies. This does not necessarily mean, however, that outside the EU, the UK will 
show the same enthusiasm for liberal trade policy. In fact, recent press reports reveal that a 
vigorous debate has erupted within the cabinet of Prime Minister Theresa May on the 
industries and sectors that should be favoured in any post-EU trade deal [see, for example, 
Martin Sandbu, Why sector-by-sector Brexit will not work, FT, 1 November 2016. He writes 
“the news that the government has offered “assurances” to Nissan that its UK operations will 
not be hurt by Brexit – the details of which remain secret and not to be shared with the public 
– has now been followed by the predictable “me too” demands from other manufacturing 
sectors. It also gives the best hint of what the government hopes to achieve for post-Brexit 
relations between Britain and the EU… What is emerging is a sector-by-sector approach, 
where the government will aim to retain fully free trade for some but presumably not all 
sectors.”12]. The debate within Prime Minister May’s cabinet demonstrates the logical 
                                                          
12 Page accessible here 
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incoherence between the free-trade-in-all-sectors discourse of Brexiters during the 
referendum campaign and the current more nuanced reality.  
 
Bilateral deals lead to trade liberalisation only if the other country agrees to open up its 
economy. The other country will be willing to do it only if it gains preferential access into the 
UK market. Therefore, bilateral deals work because they discriminate against everybody else. 
This is not consistent with a policy of free trade. As shown in the previous section, bilateral 
trade deals become progressively less attractive. This means that potential trade partners will 
eventually be less willing to open up their economies because the UK market will 
progressively become less attractive after the first trade agreements, unless the UK 
unilaterally removes its remaining barriers and restrictions to foreign goods and services. But 
the UK may become less eager to remove them.  
 
A person who has consistently advocated both exit from the EU and the pursuit of a policy of 
unilateral free trade is Prof Patrick Minford. His views and work can be accessed at the 
website of “Economists for Brexit”13]. But the arguments of Economists for Brexit are based 
on an outdated view of trade. They presume that trade, investment and establishment are 
mostly affected by border restrictions. But as explained earlier, most of these custom duties 
are very low. Most trade is affected by domestic regulation. But because Economists for Brexit 
also believe that the EU is over-regulated, they expect British industry and service sectors to 
flourish outside the EU. Although for sure some regulation in the EU is excessive, they are 
probably wrong to think that the EU is over-regulated across the board, that the UK will 
choose to discard all EU rules already incorporated in the domestic UK legislation and that UK 
companies will ignore the “Brussels effect”. The “Brussels effect” is not the outcome of 
negotiated deals but the pulling power of the largest single market in the world. UK 
companies have already incurred the extra costs from regulation, even if such regulation is 
excessive. It will be irrational for them to abandon a market they already know and for which 
they have absorbed entry costs. In addition, as expressed in a recent paper of the UK Trade 
Policy Observatory of the University of Susses,  the EU is actually very well advanced in terms 
of trade liberalisation in services.14 By leaving the EU, the UK would face the risk of joining the 
much less liberalisation-enhancing WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
 
More pro-liberal to more protectionist policy 
 
However, an issue that has not yet been examined in the literature is whether a country such 
as the UK that has traditionally advocated a liberal policy as a Member of the EU could become 
more protectionist when it leaves the EU. The slowly emerging evidence from Mrs May’s 
contacts with various industry leaders suggests that she is not an ideological free trader but 
a pragmatist who would rather protect selected industries. Of course, at this stage, the 
outcome of future negotiations is speculative. 
 
But, in principle, past conduct cannot be a guarantee that future strategy will follow the same 
line. When both the UK and the other Member States engage in negotiations in Brussels, it is 
                                                          
13 Website accessible here 
14 See  “Services trade in the UK: what is at stake?” of Ingo Borchert, November 2016 
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reasonable to presume that they do what negotiators often do: overstate their positions and 
exaggerate the costs from any concessions so as to get the other side to back down first.  
 
To see how exit from the EU may lead the UK to change its pro-liberal attitude, let us consider 
the possibility that if the UK would reveal its true position, while it is an EU Member State, it 
would not prefer completely free trade, but some limited restriction on international 
transactions. Since, however, the other Member States would then push for more 
restrictions, the UK pretends that it favours completely free trade. The matrix below indicates 
possible pay-offs. Although both sides would gain more by stating their true positions, the 
dominant strategy is for both sides to exaggerate their true preferences. Hence, the hitherto 
pro-market position of the UK in Brussels does not necessarily imply that a unilaterally 
decided policy in Westminster will be equally liberal. The Nash equilibrium is indicated by the 
pay-offs in the shaded box. The total pay-off is 4 [2+2]. Both sides would be better off and the 
total pay-off would be higher [6 = 3+3], if they both revealed their true preferences. 
 
Table 3: Pay-offs of stating true policy preferences and of exaggerating them 
 
 Other Member States 
True position 
[for small trade 
restrictions] 
Exaggerated position 
[for higher trade 
restrictions] 
 
 
UK 
True position 
[for small trade 
restrictions] 
3,3 1, 4 
Exaggerated position 
[for free trade] 
4,1 2,2 
 
 
The “Brussels mitigating effect” 
 
A fact of life of policy formulation in Brussels is that decision-making procedures are complex 
and adopted legislation is always the result of compromises between different Member 
States and different EU institutions. The compromises that enable the legislative machinery 
to function are presumed to lead to negative outcomes. This is not necessarily so. The 
involvement of EU institutions may in fact temper protectionist tendencies in individual 
Member States. The following example illustrates well what may be called the “Brussels 
mitigating effect”.  
 
Assume that there are three similar countries each with 100 voters who cast their ballots to 
choose among three different policies, X, Y and Z. Let policies X and Y be the same in all 
countries. Policies X and Y are nation-wide and generate benefits for the whole country. The 
first number after each policy in table 4 below indicates the direct benefits to citizens who 
vote in favour of that policy and the second number indicates the nation-wide benefits. 
Nation-wide benefits are twice as large as the direct benefits. In each country there is, in 
addition, a sectoral lobby in favour of policy Zi. The subscript “i” indicates the country. 
 
13 
 
The chosen policy in each political system is the one that commands the most votes and each 
citizens casts a vote in favour of the policy that creates the most direct effects. As indicated 
in the table below, before integration each country chooses a sectoral policy. However, after 
integration, in the EU of 300 voters, policies are chosen in common and the policy that is 
adopted by all three countries acting together is policy X. It is shown by the shaded box. This 
is because policy X commands the most votes across all countries and also generates the most 
benefits. Common decision-making prevents national policies from being determined by 
dominant local interests. 
 
Table 4: The “mitigating effect” of centralised decision making 
 
Policies/issues Member States EU 
A [100] B [100] C [100] A+B+C [300] 
Economy-wide 
policy X 
X = 40/80 X = 40/80 X = 40/80 X = 120/240 
[40%] 
Economy-wide 
policy Y 
Y = 15/30 Y = 15/30 Y = 15/30 Y = 45/90 
[15%] 
Sectoral policies 
Z1, Z2, Z3 
Z1 = 45/45 Z2 = 45/45 Z3 = 45/45 Zi = 45/135 
[15%, 15%, 15%] 
 
Conversely, after exit from the EU, the UK political system may become dominated by strong 
local interests. Instead of choosing X that will generate 80 of nation-wide benefits, it may 
choose Z with only 45 of benefits. 
 
According to press reports, industrial leaders are vying for influence in Downing Street15 . It is 
impossible to know at this stage whether the lobbying outcome will be a wise balance of 
competing interests. 
 
 
The consequences of “taking back control” 
 
Most recent trade agreements are “mixed” partly because they deal with issues that fall also 
within the competences of Member States and partly because they are “deep” agreements 
addressing problems caused by discordant domestic regulations. As explained previously, the 
EU benefits from the “Brussels effect” whereby international rules converge to standards set 
by the EU. What is likely to happen when the UK takes back control? 
 
Assume that control over a policy can be measured on a scale from 0 [= no control] to 100 [= 
complete control]. Further assume that countries agree to comply with the following 
reciprocal rule: “I control as much of your policy as you control of mine”. For example, if I get 
                                                          
15 See the Brexit page on the FT’s internet site and in particular the article of 31 October 2016 
“Queueing up behind Nissan” 
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to control 10 (out of 100) of your policy, you also get to control 10 (out of 100) of my policy. 
This implies that if you control 10 of my policy, then I control only 90 of mine and vice versa. 
This leads to two extremes: i) If I control 100 of my policy, then I control zero of your policy; 
ii) if I control zero of my policy, then I control 100 of your policy. It follows that, by wishing to 
take back control of its own policies, the UK will lose influence over other (EU)  countries’ 
policies. In short, the UK loses leverage both at the EU level and at the global level. This is 
illustrated in the diagram below. 
 
Graph 1: The policy control trade-off 
 
 
 
This loss of influence over others’ policies is bound to be costly, even if it is difficult to quantify 
the benefits and costs for the UK from regaining policy independence. Conversely, it may be 
worthwhile to give up some control over one’s own policy in order to benefit from shaping 
the policies of others. There can be no guarantee that complete policy independence is an 
optimum outcome in an inter-dependent world. 
 
It is apt to conclude this section with an observation by Martin Sandbu. He notes that the 
emerging preference of the UK government to favour certain industries will mean that any 
trade agreement between the UK and the EU will result in some control being ceded back to 
the EU. He writes that “Brexit was sold to a majority of the electorate with the slogan “Take 
back control”. A sector-by-sector approach to Brexit would amount to: “Take back control, 
except in sectors that we care particularly about, where we will give up the control we used 
to have as EU members (as well as anything else the EU negotiates in return for sectoral 
market access).” Good luck defending that to the public.”16 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Martin Sandbu, “Why sector-by-sector Brexit will not work”, Financial Times, 1 November 2016 
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Conclusions 
 
This paper has addressed four claims concerning the trade options of the UK after it leaves 
the EU. It has argued that all of those claims contain either logical inconsistencies or ignore 
inherently serious drawbacks. Exiting from the EU’s customs union will free the UK to 
conclude its own trade agreements. However, this freedom is not costless. Companies trading 
with the EU will have to comply with rules of origin. In fact, given the “Brussels effect”, UK 
companies may also choose to comply with EU regulations after the UK’s formal withdrawal.  
 
More significantly, it is plain wrong to believe that a sequence of trade agreements will be 
equally attractive to all potential trade partners. 
 
The paper has also argued that in an inter-dependent world, taking back control of own 
policies will be tantamount to losing control over others’ policies. This is not necessarily the 
optimum outcome for the UK.
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